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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE 1986 PROVISIONS TO ENCOURAGE FOREIGN




When the People's Republic of China (China) initiated the open
door policy' in 1979, investors fled to its enormous domestic market
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See Chongwei, China's Utilization of Foreign Funds and Relevant Policies, in
ECONoMic REFORM IN THE PRC 105-14 (G. Wang trans. ed. 1982) (stating that the
leadership in China announced in 1979 that it would promote modernization through
an open door policy toward foreign investment, technology, and know-how). The open
door policy in China is closely related to widespread political and economic reforms
aimed at spurring local enterprise and individual initiative, and improving production
through greater reliance on market forces rather than centralized control. Horsley, The
Regulation of China's Foreign Trade, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 6 (M. Moser 2d ed. 1984). Promoted through
the efforts of Deng Xiaoping, the open door policy provoked concern among Marxist-
conservative elements over the possible corrupting effect that "bourgeois decadent influ-
ences" might have on socialist ideals. Bonavia, Cautious Leaps Forward, FAR E. EcoN.
REv., May 1, 1986, at 18. Critics of the policy gained ground during the January 1987
student demonstrations that led to the forced resignation of former Party General Sec-
retary Hu Yaobang. Drozdiak, Deng Signals Slowdown in Pace of China's Reforms,
Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1987, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter Deng Signals Slowdown]. Prior to
his ouster, many believed Hu would succeed Deng as the premier leader in China. See
Hu Tours West Europe, ASIA BULL., Aug. 1986, at 121 (naming Hu as likely succes-
sor to Deng). Hu, along with Zhao Ziyang, worked closely with premier leader Deng to
introduce pragmatic economic reforms in China. See Not Too Much Reform, Please,
WORLD PRESS REV., Mar. 1987, at 11-12 (noting that conservatives have set back
many of Deng's reforms). Zhao replaced Hu as acting leader of the Communist Party.
Delfs, Zhao Draws the Line, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 7, 1987, at 19.
Immediately after Hu's ouster, Deng attempted to reassure foreigners that the open
door policy would continue. See Southerland, Deng Says China Should Seek "Further
Opening" to World, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1987, at Al, col. I (reporting that Deng's
comments were intended to reassure foreign investors concerned about continued open-
ness). Zhao also announced that he would confine the campaign against "bourgeois
liberalization," begun after the ouster of Hu, to party members and would not create a
broader disruptive political movement. Delfs, supra, at 19. At the time, however, some
China observers believed that the power struggle had stalled the economic reform pro-
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with expectations of earning huge profits.2 As the realities of doing bus-
iness under the nascent legal system3 in China emerged, however, in-
vestor complaints grew,4 reaching a peak in 1986.1 The State Council,'
gram and seriously eroded Deng's power. Drozdiak, Pace of Reforms Falters in China
as Opposition Campaign Advances, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1987, at A3, col. 4. During
Secretary of State George Shultz's 1987 visit to China, Deng indicated that although it
is possible the pace of reforms may slow to restrain political turmoil, China still intends
to build a more open economy with expanded ties to the West. Deng Signals Slow-
down, supra, at A27, col. 1.
Commentators maintained that foreign investors would feel more comfortable after
the selection of the new Politburo in November 1987, because foreign investors would
know whether the Chinese leadership supported market reforms and openness to the
West. Cheng, Caution Prevails as Politics Takes Centre Stage, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Mar. 19, 1987, at 88-89. In November 1987, the Thirteenth Communist Party Con-
gress elected Zhao Ziyang to lead the Party. Deng Xiaoping and many other senior
cadres stepped down from the Central Committee, precluding themselves from serving
on the Politburo, the main policy-making body of the Party. Gargan, China's New
Style and Substance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1987, at Al, col. 2. Zhao, along with Hu
Qili, age 58, Li Peng, age 59, Qiao Shi, age 63, and Yao Yilin, age 70, all newcomers,
comprise the Standing Committee, the inner circle of the Politburo. Gargan, Chinese
Premier Wins Appointment to Top Party Post, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1987, at A8, col.
1.
2. See Prybyla, The Value of the China Connection, 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 45, 45-46
(1979) (discussing the illusion of the early views that foreign investors would derive
huge profits on investments in the Chinese market); Sterba, China Turning Foreign
Investors Bitter, Asian Wall St. J., July 18-19, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (stating that when the
doors to China opened, many investors were eager to tap the vast supply of custbmers
and cheap labor).
3. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the
legal system in China).
4. See Cheng, supra note 1, at 88 (reporting that foreign business people blame the
poor investment environment in China on bureaucratic inefficiency, excessive costs, in-
adequate legal protection, lack of access to the domestic market, and difficulty in con-
verting renminbi-earned profits into foreign currency); Fung, Peking Tackles Foreign
Investors' Fears, Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1986, at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter Foreign
Investors' Fears] (discussing foreigners' problems with bureaucratic inefficiency, costly
operations, and foreign exchange shortages); Burns, Why Investors are Sour On China,
N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, at F7, col. I (describing investor doubts concerning access
to Chinese markets, due to foreign exchange problems, contract interpretation disputes,
and problems in dealing with the Chinese bureaucracy); Sterba, supra note 2, at 1, col.
4 (noting that the investment climate has gone from bad to worse and that many for-
eigners are threatening to pull their investments out of China).
5. See Sullivan, The Investment Climate, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 8
(stating that investors challenged the attractiveness and competitiveness of the business
climate in China more directly in 1986 than ever before); Cohen & Chang, New For-
eign Investment Provisions, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 14 (speculating that
the new Provisions, standing alone, will not end the recent plethora of criticism about
the investment climate in China).
6. See Wik, Navigating the Bureaucracy, in How TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 112-13 (1984) (explaining that the State Council is the
highest ranking organ of state power and economic authority in China). The Commu-
nist Party, the State Council, and the military dominate the government in China. Id.
The State Council oversees central government agencies and ministries and has the
power to issue law. Id.
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concerned about a twenty percent decline in investment in the first half
of 19867 promulgated The Provisions to Encourage Foreign Investment
(Provisions) in October 1986.8 The ability of China to compete with
neighboring Asian economies is a second concern underlying the
provisions.9
Enactment of the Provisions indicates that the highest-ranking state
leaders in China10 are aware that foreign investors" are dissatisfied
with the present investment climate.1 2 Concern about the deterrent ef-
7. Salem, A Genuine Effort, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 23, 1986, at 170; accord
Sullivan, supra note 5, at 8 (reporting that the contracted value of new investment
projects decreased 42% in the first months of 1986, relative to the same period during
1985); see also Fung, Peking Announces Regulations Meant to Nullify Foreign Inves-
tors in China, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1986, at 17, col. 5 [hereinafter Peking Announces
Regulations] (stating that the 20% decline in foreign investment in the first half of
1986 is the first decline since Peking opened its doors in 1978); cf. Cheng, supra note 1,
at 88 (reporting that new foreign investment in 1986 fell nearly 50% from the previous
year). Large investment contracts, however, have not completely disappeared. See
Sinton, Shanghai Center Will Be Home For Westerners, San Francisco Chronicle,
Nov. 14, 1986, at 39, col. I (reporting the signing of a S100 million contract between
an American firm, Charles Pankow Associates, and the Shanghai municipality for the
construction of a huge self-contained business and residential development).
8. Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the En-
couragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated by the State Council of the People's
Republic of China on Oct. 11, 1986 [hereinafter Provisions], reprinted in I Com. Bus.
& Trade L.: People's Republic of China (0. Nee ed. 1987) Booklet 3, at 171 [hereinaf-
ter Com. Bus. & Trade L.]. The stated purposes of the Provisions are "to improve the
investment environment, facilitate the absorption of foreign investment, introduce ad-
vanced technology, improve product quality, expand exports to generate foreign ex-
change and develop the national economy." Id. art. 1.
9. See China Adopts Measures Easing Conditions for Foreign Investors, Investor's
Daily, Oct. 14, 1986, at 5, col. I [hereinafter China Adopts Measures] (reporting that
Zhu Rongji, Vice Minister of the State Economic Commission, stated that the invest-
ment climate in China will improve with the Provisions, and that the improvement will
permit greater competition with the economies of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and
other Asian countries).
10. See Wik, supra note 6, at 112-13 (explaining that the State Council is the
highest-ranking organ of state and economic power).
11. See generally C. SCHLYTER & A. SEBELIUS, JoINT VENTURES IN CHINA 5
(1986) (stating that companies from the United States and Hong Kong are the most
important foreign investors in China, and that several European countries are also sig-
nificant investors). This Comment emphasizes the experiences of United States
investors.
12. See Salem, From the Top Down, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 6, 1986, at 84
[hereinafter Salem, From the Top Down] (stating that the Provisions explicitly recog-
nize that arbitrary fees, bureaucratic inefficiency, a low-calibre labor force, and diffi-
culties in procuring raw materials have caused problems for investors in their joint
ventures and cooperatives); Chang, Chinese Said Aware of Woes Facing Investors,
Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 17-18, 1986, at 1, col. 5 (asserting that new measures are a sign
that officials recognize investor problems, but that additional measures and enforce-
ment procedures are needed); Peking Announces Regulations, supra note 7, at 17, col.
5 (stating that officials worry that investors will shun the People's Republic at a time
when the country needs additional foreign currency).
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fect that investor discontent has on new investors also underlies the
Provisions.1" The Provisions are the long awaited response to what Chi-
nese leaders perceive as a serious threat to the viability of China to act
as a host country for foreign investment.
To encourage foreign investment, the new Provisions grant special
benefits to projects that qualify as "export enterprises" and "technolog-
ically advanced enterprises." 4 Enterprises not within the two new cate-
gories also receive incentives in various articles of the Provisions.", The
Provisions address a significant number of investor concerns ranging
from high operation costs to bureaucratic entanglement.1" The Provi-
sions, however, leave some important issues unaddressed. For example,
the enormous problems associated with the foreign exchange shortage
in China 17 receive only modest attention.'8 In addition, the Provisions
do not address dispute resolution problems.' 9
Another sign of the attempts of China to improve its international trade relationships
is its decision to apply to join the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).
See China Files Membership Application, Council Hears U.S. Farm Trade Charges
Against Japan, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 910, 915 (1986) (indicating that China
wants to expand its economic and trade relations with other nations).
13. Sterba, supra note 2, at 1, col. 3 (stating that new investors are staying away
due to current investor problems).
14. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 2. The Provisions encourage foreigners to estab-
lish Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese-foreign cooperative ventures and
wholly foreign-owned enterprises within China. Id.; see also infra notes 49-51 and ac-
companying text (explaining the qualifications for export and technologically advanced
enterprises).
15. See Provisions, supra note 8, arts. 10-17 (conferring benefits on all enterprises
involving foreign investment regardless of export and technologically advanced enter-
prise qualification); see also id. art. 19 (stating that all enterprises using funds received
from foreign investors receive benefits, except where articles expressly refer only to
export or technologically advanced enterprises).
16. Id. arts. 3, 17.
17. See Gelatt, The Foreign Exchange Quandary, CHINA Bus. REV., May-June
1986, at 28 (stating that the foreign exchange shortage is the thorniest problem facing
investors). Investors experience difficulty repatriating earnings and buying equipment
abroad because China has a nonconvertible currency. Id.; see also infra notes 160-76
and accompanying text (discussing foreign exchange problems facing foreigners in
China). The low foreign exchange reserves in China are a serious deterrent to increased
foreign investment. See Berthelsen, Asian Economies Predicted to Expand 3.5% in
1987, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1986, at 8, col. 1 (stating that large trade and cur-
rent accounts deficits from 1984 to 1986 drained the foreign exchange reserves in
China, prompting Chinese leaders to seek assistance from the International Monetary
Fund).
18. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 14 (allowing foreign exchange adjustments among
foreign enterprises under supervision of the foreign exchange control department re-
gardless of co-ownership); see infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (discussing
the incomplete solution for foreign exchange problems resulting from article 14).
19. See Frisbee, The Investment Treaty Impasse, CHINA Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct.
1986, at 41 (discussing problems arising due to the Chinese insistence that investors
settle their disputes according to Chinese law, rather than through the use of an inter-
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This Comment analyzes the extent to which the new Provisions re-
solve the problems foreign investors experienced under prior law. The
discussion concentrates on the effect the Provisions will have on equity
joint ventures, the most common form of investment in China.2 0 Part I
provides a brief overview of the evolving investment laws in China. Part
II examines the new Provisions that target export and technologically
advanced enterprises for special treatment, and analyzes the impact
these Provisions have on the troubled investment environment. Part III
analyzes the Provisions that affect all foreign investment enterprises.
This section also evaluates the effect of these broadly encompassing
Provisions on the overall business climate in China. This Comment de-
termines that many of the cost-cutting measures contained in the Pro-
visions are significant improvements for foreign investors. Overall, the
Provisions are a step in the right direction, but cannot correct all the
problems plaguing foreign investors in China. After placing the Provi-
sions and foreign investment in the context of the political conditions in
China, this Comment concludes that the newly appointed Chinese lead-
ership will enforce the new Provisions, and guide the evolution of Chi-
nese foreign investment law toward more openness.
national arbitral body). The China Council For the Promotion of International Trade
(CCPIT) is the arbitral body in China. Id. at 49. Investors negotiating joint venture
contracts repeatedly encounter difficulties in reaching agreement on dispute resolution
clauses. See Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Co-operation with China, in
FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
supra note 1, at 296, 299 (stating that negotiations have made it obvious that China
continues to prefer arbitration located in China, rather than abroad). Under the arbi-
tration commission rules of the CCPIT, only Chinese nationals may serve as arbitra-
tors. Yeow Ming Choo, Arbitration, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 48-49. In-
vestors are uncomfortable with this system due to the possible bias the Chinese
arbitrators may display. Dispute settlement issues are still vigorously debated during
bilateral investment treaty contract negotiations. Frisbee, supra, at 41.
20. C. SCHLYTER & A. SEBELIUS, supra note 11, at 1. Chinese government statis-
tics indicate that as of 1985, foreigners had invested S6 billion in foreign equity invest-
ments in China. Burns, supra note 4, at Fl, col. 1. Approximately SI.4 billion of this
was American investment. Id. At the end of 1985, there were 2,300 foreign equity joint
ventures in China. Id. There were 1,400 new joint ventures in 1986, compared to 1,900
in 1985. Cheng, supra note 1, at 88. As of September, 1987, there were 3,988 joint
ventures in China. Jinming, Drive Opens to Attract Investment, China Daily, Oct. 27,
1987, at 2, col. 1.
The following attributes distinguish equity joint ventures from other forms of invest-
ments: (1) pooled assets, (2) shared losses and profits, and (3) joint management. Tor-
bert & Thompson, China's Joint Venture Law: A Preliminary Analysis, 12 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 820-22 (1979). The foreign partner frequently provides the equip-
ment and technology, while the Chinese partner contributes labor, land, and other re-
sources. U.S.-Chinese Equity Joint Ventures, CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1985, at 33.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE EVOLVING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW IN CHINA
Traditional China did not rely on law and legal concepts to order
society. 2 During the first half of the twentieth century, the Nationalist
government2 2 introduced the rule of law and respect for legal institu-
tions into Chinese society. After the Communist Revolution, China
attempted to expand the role of legal institutions and legal concepts in
Chinese society. 4 The Cultural Revolution, however, destroyed most of
these efforts.25 Since launching an ambitious effort to modernize 2
21. See V. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 13 (1978) (explaining that rulers in traditional Chi-
nese society governed by means of virtue rather than law). Reliance on law and legal
concepts represented a loss of virtue and a breakdown in the educational system. Id.
See generally D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 6-15 (1967) (describ-
ing the Confucian basis of traditional Chinese law and the interaction of ii, rules of
proper conduct facilitating a harmonious social order, and fa, written laws and admin-
istrative rules imposed by a superior authority in the traditional Chinese legal system).
Early Chinese legal codes were overwhelmingly penal in nature and did not provide
protection for most individual rights. Id. at 49.
22. See R. QUESTED, SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 98 (1984) (stating that Jiang
Kaishek declared the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928). The Na-
tionalists governed China until they were defeated in the Communist Revolution in
1949. Id. at 115.
23. Epstein, Long March to the Present, Long Way to Go, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Mar. 19, 1987, at 103.
24. Lubman, New Developments in Law in the People's Republic of China, 1 Nw.
U.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 122, 122-24 (1979). From 1949 to 1957 China experimented
with developing a legal system modeled in part on the legal system of the Soviet Union
and in part on the experience of the Chinese Communist Party while it controlled areas
of China prior to its victory over the Nationalist forces in 1949. Id. at 123. During
these early years, China did not consistently apply objective legal standards. Id. In-
stead, subjective judgments of administrative officers prevailed. Id. The anti-rightist
movement that followed the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" from 1956 to 1957 precipi-
tated attacks on legal specialists and halted the attempts to codify legal norms and
develop a court system. Id. at 124.
25. See id. (describing attacks on the formal legal system during the Cultural
Revolution). Mao Zedong spurred the Cultural Revolution to purge counterrevolution-
ary elements from the Communist Party bureaucracy. See generally H. LEE, THE
POLITICS OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 47-63 (1978) (noting some activi-
ties that occurred during the Cultural Revolution). The Cultural Revolution was a time
of uninterrupted upheaval in Chinese society, as the leadership of the Communist Party
encouraged the general population, and students in particular, to seize power from in-
stitutions of authority. Id. During this decade of destruction, the People's Liberation
Army destroyed the nascent police, court, and procutorial systems. Hsia, Sources of
Law in the People's Republic of China: Recent Developments, 14 INT'L LAW. 25, 27
(1980). During the Cultural Revolution, Mao's forces viewed legal specialists as ser-
vants of the bourgeoisie whose work concealed injustice at the expense of workers and
peasants. Id. The Red Guard publicly humiliated legal specialists in criticism sessions,
and sent them to work in the countryside. Id. Many Chinese virtually abandoned the
practice of law during this period. Id.
26. See Lussenburg, Joint Venture Investment in The People's Republic of China:
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through the introduction of foreign capital, technology, and know-
how,2 7 China has promulgated an array of laws to provide incentives
and protection to foreign investors.28
The 1979 Joint Venture Law (JVL) 29 was the first major law cover-
ing foreign investment" and will continue to govern various aspects of
equity joint ventures3' that qualify as export enterprises32 or technolog-
ically advanced enterprises.3 3 The JVL contains fifteen skeletal articles
that broadly define terms for foreign investment.' In 1983, the State
Council issued implementing regulations (JVL Regulations)35 to estab-
A Continuing Challenge, 63 CAN. BAR REV. 545, 545-46 (1985) (discussing the four
modernizations plan in China that stresses agriculture, industry, defense, and
technology).
China now recognizes individual merit and economic incentives as necessary evils of
achieving modernization. Id. The landmark 1984 Central Committee Decision explic-
itly states that wages should reflect productivity and quality of work and that prosper-
ity will never mean absolute egalitarianism. Id. at 546; Decision of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure of
October 20, 1984, reprinted in Beijing Rev., October 19, 1984, at 4-7. Despite the
introduction of some market incentives, China retains its centrally planned economy.
See generally G. CHow, THE CHINESE ECONOMY 53-59 (1983) (analyzing the develop-
ment from a centrally planned economy in China to a mixed economy with an empha-
sis on central planning).
27. See Bullitt, An Exclusive Interview with Rong Yiren, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1979, at 4-5 (head of the China International Trade and Investment Corporation
(CITIC)) (stating that China must import foreign capital, technology, and know-how
to achieve its four part modernization); see also C. SCHLYTER & A. SEBEtUUS, supra
note 11, at 3 (explaining that China encourages foreign investment to obtain the capi-
tal and technology necessary to develop the Chinese economy).
28. See Lussenburg, supra note 26, at 546 (stating that China decided to make its
internal economic and legal structures more attractive to foreigners); Perkins, The
Prospects For China's Economic Reforms, in MODERNIZING CHINA: POST-MAo RE-
FORM AND DEVELOPMENT 46-47 (A. Barnett & R. Clough ed. 1986) (stating that at
this time prospective investors were cautious in approaching China due to the absence
of a legal framework). See generally Moser, Foreign Investment in China: The Legal
Framework in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUJB-
LIC OF CHINA, supra note 1, at 106-42 (detailing the recent development of foreign
investment law in China).
29. The Law of The People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investment, adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's
Congress on July 1, 1979, reprinted in 18 I.L.M 1163 (1979) [hereinafter JVL]. The
law became effective on July 8, 1979. Id.
30. See Lussenburg, supra note 26, at 546 (stating that the JVL is the beginning of
a series of laws aimed at encouraging foreign investment).
31. See supra note 20 (distinguishing equity joint ventures from other forms of
investment).
32. See infra note 53 and accompanying text (providing the definition of export
enterprises).
33. See infra note 54 and accompanying text (providing the definition of technolog-
ically advanced enterprises).
34. JVL, supra note 29.
35. See Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, art. 8, promulgated
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lish requirements for inter alia joint venture approval and registra-
tion,36 governance and control,37 labor management,38 and foreign ex-
change and banking.39 Chinese investment law has evolved in this
manner: implementing regulations follow the issuance of the basic
law.40 Implementing regulations determine how initial laws are put into
effect and are therefore of central concern to investors .4 The forthcom-
ing implementing regulations for the 1986 Provisions will provide de-
tails on how central government authorities will interpret and imple-
ment the new measures.4 2 The impact of the new measures will emerge
by the State Council on Sept. 20, 1983, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1033 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter JVL Regulations].
36. Id. art. 33.
37. Id. art. 73.
38. Id. art. 91.
39. Id. arts. 73-79.
40. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that the enactment of laws preceding
implementing regulations is the normal practice in Chinese legal development); see,
e.g., Regulations on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment, adopted at the Fifteenth Session of the National People's Congress Stand-
ing Committee of Aug. 26, 1980, reprinted in I Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8,
Booklet 3, at 111 [hereinafter JV Labor Management Regulations]; Detailed Rules
and Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Re-
public of China Concerning Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment,
promulgated Dec. 14, 1980, reprinted in 1 Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Book-
let 5, at 21 [hereinafter JV Income Tax Regulations]; Detailed Rules and Regulations
for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Governing Enter-
prises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Enterprises with Foreign Capital, and Joint Ven-
tures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, approved by the State Council on July
19, 1983, and adopted by the State Administration of Exchange Control on Aug. 1,
1983, reprinted in 2 Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 7, at 8 [hereinafter
1983 FX Regulations].
41. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 8 (reporting that foreign investment did not in-
crease in China until after the release of the 1983 JVL implementing regulations).
42. See Cheng, supra note 1, at 89 (reporting that the Chinese government was
preparing to promulgate 16 to 20 sets of regulations to supplement the Provisions).
In 1986 and 1987 various government entities issued several of the implementing
regulations including the following: Provisions of the Ministry of Labor and Personnel
of the PRC on the Right of Autonomy of Enterprises with Foreign Investment in Hir-
ing Personnel and on Wages, Insurance and Welfare Expenses of Staff and Workers,
formulated by the Ministry of Labor and Personnel with the approval of the Working
Group on Foreign Investment and issued on Nov. 24, 1986, reprinted in I Com. Bus. &
Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 3, at 179; Measures of the Customs Authority of the
People's Republic of China for the Control of Materials and Parts Required to be
Imported for the Performance of Product-Export Contracts by Enterprises with For-
eign Investment, promulgated by the General Administration of Customs on Nov. 24,
1986, reprinted in I Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 3, at 183; Imple-
mentation Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Con-
cerning the Application for Import and Export Licenses by Enterprises with Foreign
Investment, issued on Jan. 24, 1987, reprinted in I Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note
8, Booklet 3, at 199; Rules of Implementation Measures of the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade Concerning the Confirmation and Assessment of Export
Enterprises and Technologically Advanced Enterprises with Foreign Investment, issued
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CHINESE INVESTMENT PROVISIONS
as investors gain experience with the Provisions coupled with the imple-
menting regulations.43
In theory, the detailed regulations provide specific guidelines for im-
plementing the laws. In practice, however, local officials rarely follow
them.44 Recalcitrant local and middle level officials, perceiving national
directives as encroachments on their authority, often disregard central
government regulations.4 5 Local officials' disregard of earlier national
measures has created skepticism among foreign observers about local
implementation of the Provisions." Along with the Provisions, however,
on Jan. 27, 1987, reprinted in I Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 3, at
203; Implementation Measures of the Ministry of Finance for Putting into Effect the
Preferential Terms on Taxation Provided in the Provisions of the State Council Re-
garding the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, issued on Jan. 30, 1987, reprinted
in 1 Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 3, at 209; Provisional Measures
Governing the Provision of Foreign Exchange Guarantees by Domestic Organizations,
approved and promulgated on Feb. 5, 1987, reprinted in 2 Com. Bus. & Trade L.,
supra note 8, Booklet 7, at 61; Provisional Regulations of the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce Governing the Proportion of Registered Capital to Total In-
vestment of Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, announced Feb. 28, 1987, reported in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, Mar. 2, 1987, at KI0; Measures
for Substitution of Importation by Products of Sino-Forcign Joint and Co-operative
Ventures, announced by the State Planning Commission, reprinted in China Daily,
Nov. 23, 1987, (Business), at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter Import Substitution Regulations];
Administrative Procedures of Import Substitution of Machinery and Electronics by
Sino-Foreign Ventures, issued by the State Planning Commission, reprinted in China
Daily, Nov. 23, 1987, (Business), at 3, col. 4 [hereinafter Import Substitution Regula-
tions for Machinery and Electronics].
43. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that the foreign business community
will have a better opportunity to evaluate the impact of the Provisions after the Chi-
nese government releases detailed implementing regulations); Cheng, supra note 1, at
89 (discussing the importance of the forthcoming regulations in clarifying the Provi-
sions); see also Lecture by Zhang Yuejiao, Deputy Section Chief, Treaties and Law
Dep't, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the People's Republic of
China (MOFERT), Fourth U.S.-China Joint Legal Seminar, at the United States De-
partment of Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 12-13, 1986) [hereinafter Zhang]
(stating that implementing regulations defining the two new enterprises are
forthcoming).
In 1982, China established the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Trade (MOFERT)
to oversee foreign trade through consolidation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Foreign Investment Commission, and the
State Import-Export Commission. Horsley, supra note 1, at 9. MOFERT is responsible
for a wide range of areas including the formulation of national foreign trade plans in
conjunction with the State Planning Commission, management of the foreign trade
system, negotiations of international trade agreements, participation in relevant inter-
national organizations, and other foreign trade matters. Id. at 9-10.
44. See Provisions To Encourage: Look Closely-There's Promise in the
Promises, Bus. CHINA, Oct. 20, 1986, at 153 [hereinafter Provisions to Encourage]
(stating that foreign investors have encountered obstinacy, outright opposition, and dis-
regard of central government directives from local officials).
45. Id.
46. See id. (stressing that past experience has created skepticism concerning the
effectiveness of the new measures).
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the State Council established the "Working Group on Foreign Invest-
ment," also known as the Leading Group.4 7 The Leading Group is
charged with overall foreign investment policy making and problem
solving,48 and is responsible for monitoring regional compliance with
the Provisions.4" Creation of the Leading Group increases the likeli-
hood that middle and local level bureaucrats will implement the new
measures targeting export and technologically advanced enterprises for
special benefits.50 Local governments released regulations shortly fol-
lowing the release of the national measures, that are consistent with the
Provisions .51 This activity indicates that local governments are cooper-
ating in the implementation of the new national measures.
The Provisions create two new types of enterprises.52 Export enter-
prises are companies that export a large percentage of their products,
thereby generating a foreign exchange surplus within the company. 3
Technologically advanced enterprises are production enterprises whose
foreign partners export advanced technology to China.54 These enter-
prises must use this advanced technology to develop new products and
upgrade and replace existing products in an effort to increase foreign
exchange earnings. 55 Investment projects that qualify under either of
47. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, Oct. 15, 1986, at
K6. The Leading Group consists of senior officials from the State Council, State Plan-
ning Commission, State Economic Commission, the Special Economic Zones Office of
the State Council, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Ministry of
Labor and Personnel, Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environment
Protection, People's Bank of China, Bank of China, General Administration of Cus-
toms, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and State Administration of
Exchange Control. Id.
48. Id.
49. Salem, supra note 7, at 170.
50. See Newsmakers: He Chunlin on Foreign Investment, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-
Dec. 1987, at 6 (discussing the establishment of local Leading Groups designed to as-
sist the national Leading Group in overseeing the implementation of the Provisions).
51. See Eliasoph, Shanghai Responds, CHINA Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 16-18
(detailing Shanghai's regulations and new administrative organs to encourage foreign
investment and reporting that eleven cities, eleven provinces, and three Special Eco-
nomic Zones (SEZs) passed such regulations).
52. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 2.
53. Id. art. 2(l). The Provisions calculate "foreign exchange surplus" by deducting
the annual foreign exchange production and operation expenditures from an enter-
prise's total annual foreign exchange revenues. Id.
54. Id. art. 2(2). The implementing regulations will clarify ambiguities in the defi-
nition of technologically advanced enterprises. Zhang, supra note 43; see Rules of Im-
plementation Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Con-
cerning the Confirmation and Assessment of Export Enterprises and Technologically
Advanced Enterprises with Foreign Investment, supra note 42 (providing the particular
attributes of the two new types of enterprises).
55. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 2(2).
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the new categories will receive official certification of their status.3
II. PROVISIONS GRANTING SPECIAL BENEFITS TO
EXPORT AND TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED
ENTERPRISES
A. IMPROVED ACCESS AND PRICING FOR UTILITIES
The Provisions grant export and technologically advanced enterprises
priority access to water, electricity, transportation services, and com-
munication facilities required for production and operation. The Pro-
visions also stipulate that state-owned suppliers will charge the two new
types of enterprises the same prices charged to state-owned enter-
prises.6 8 Prior law already required state-owned suppliers to charge
Sino-foreign and state-owned enterprises the same prices.60 Therefore,
the priority access is new law, while the rule on utility prices merely
restates old law.
Cost problems and difficulties in obtaining access to utilities plagued
foreign investors under prior law. For examrple, electric utility supplies
"guaranteed" in contracts were often cut off in the middle of produc-
tion, causing production cost increases.60 In addition, despite stipula-
tions on equal pricing, foreign ventures often paid higher utility rates
than state-owned enterprises. 6e
Under prior law, businesses also faced delays in the installation of
56. Rules of Implementation Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela-
tions and Trade Concerning the Confirmation and Assessment of Export Enterprises
and Technologically Advanced Enterprises with Foreign Investment, supra note 42; see
also Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 110. Beijing and Shanghai have already certi-
fied those projects in their respective jurisdictions that qualify as export or technologi-
cally advanced enterprises. Eliasoph, supra note 51, at 17.
57. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 5; Salem, supra note 7, at 170.
58. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 5; see also Salem, supra note 7, at 170 (stating
that fees will equal those charged to state-run enterprises); Peking Announces Regula-
lions, supra note 7, at 17, col. 5 (discussing the fee incentive plan to encourage foreign
investment).
59. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 65(3j. These expenses are paid in ren-
minbi. Id.
60. C. SCHLYTER & A. SEBELIUS, supra note 11, at 56-58 (describing a year long
production delay, due to problems with water and electricity supply); see also Morrow,
Power Shortages Major Headache, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Mar. 19, 1987, at 92-97 (ex-
plaining that China is experiencing the worst power shortage in its history). A solution
to the power shortage is not expected until the end of the century. Id.; cf. Southerland,
Tenants of Chinese Building Witness Beijing Bureaucracy, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1987,
at F2, col. 1 (reporting that Chinese officials cut off the heating in a new high-rise
office building when the Canadian manager refused to pay a one-time fee of S458,221
for heating services, not included in the original contract).
61. See Foreign Investors' Fears, supra note 4, at 1, col. 4 (stating that Sino-for-
eign joint ventures paid more for utilities than state-owned enterprises).
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telephone and telex systems due to poor networking 2 and unpredict-
able cargo-space allocations from transportation services. 3 Moreover,
on the rare occasions when communication services were available,
prices were exorbitant." These access problems and high prices in tele-
communications and transportation services also increased production
costs and reduced product competitiveness on the international
market. 5
The new grant of priority access and the renewed commitment to
decreased prices for communication, transportation, and utility services
is a significant step toward improving the business environment in
China. Priority access to utility, transportation, and communication
services will provide predictability to investors whose production sched-
ules and costs were upset in the past due to sudden service shortages
and overpricing. The Provisions, therefore, are likely to curtail produc-
tion cost increases previously associated with utility supply uncertainty.
The benefits, however, are limited to ventures qualifying as export or
technologically advanced enterprises.
It is unlikely, however, that the utility measures will have as exten-
sive an effect as originally thought. China has a severe power shortage
that is likely to last through the next century.66 The shortage may un-
dermine the value of a priority in the allocation of electrical power. If
electrical power is unavailable, a priority allocation system is useless.
The priority access to communications services suffers from a similar
problem. China is still developing its telecommunications systems.67 As
a result, priority access to an unsophisticated communications network,
though helpful, may not extensively benefit foreign investors. Despite
the limited benefits of these Provisions, the grants of priority access to
services basic to successful business operations and the reiteration that
foreign investors will pay the same prices as state-owned enterprises are
meaningful improvements for foreign investors.
62. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 11-12.
63. Cheng, supra note 1, at 89; see Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 11-12 (stat-
ing that in China, the success of a foreign enterprise depends on its ability to secure
basic services, such as timely cargo space).
64. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 12.
65. Lussenburg, supra note 26, at 560 (noting foreign investors' concerns about the
effect that supply shortages and artificially high prices have on profits and international
competitiveness).
66. See Morrow, supra note 60, at 92 (discussing the severity of the current power
shortage and potential solutions).
67. See Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 11-12 (describing the underdeveloped
communications system in China).
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B. STANDARDS FOR LOWER LAND RENTS
The Provisions address land rent, or site use fees. Article 4 of the
new Provisions lowers the valuation standards for site use fees for both
export and technologically advanced enterprises.6 8 The new standards
are expressed in renminbi (RMB).68 The standards are RMB 5 to
RMB 20 per square meter per year. 0 Where there is a one-time charge
or where the enterprise intends to develop the site on its own, the new
standards set a limitation of RMB 3 per square meter per year7
Foreigners cannot legally own land in China. 2 Investors, therefore,
must acquire the right to use a site from the local government. 3 Under
prior law, local governments had broad discretion to establish site use
fees according to geographical and other conditions.7' This broad dis-
cretion allowed local officials to impose exorbitant land rents. 75 Internal
guidelines failed to provide meaningful standards to limit the discretion
68. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 4; see also Foreign Investment Regulations
Viewed as a Welcome but Modest Step, CHINA Bus. & TRADE, Oct. 23, 1986, at 3
[hereinafter Foreign Investment Regulations] (describing the reduction of land use fee
rates); Peking Announces Regulations, supra note 7, at 17, col. 5 (explaining that the
regulations, in part, are designed to reduce land use fees). Article 4 applies only to
export and technologically advanced enterprises not located in busy urban sectors of
large cities. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 4.
69. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 4. Renminbi is the Chinese currency. Perkins,
supra note 28, at 46. As of November 1987, RMB 3.70 was equivalent to U.S. SI.00.
Id.
70. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 4; see also Salem, supra note 5, at 170 (reporting
the new standards of RMB 5 to RMB 20). Local officials may grant exemptions from
site use fees at their discretion. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 4.
71. See Salem, supra note 7, at 170 (reporting the new lower standard for investors
who are developing sites on their own).
72. See Pattison, China's Developing Legal Framework for Foreign Investment:
Experience and Expectations, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 89, 94-95 & n.18 (1981)
(citing Remarks of Ren Jian-xin, Director of Legal Affairs Department, CCPIT, at the
Conference on Selling Technology to China, National Council for U.S.-China Trade, in
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 5, 1979)) (stating that local authorities will determine fees for
using a joint venture site).
73. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 47. The right to use a site is not assigna-
ble. Id. art. 53.
74. Id. art. 49. The People's governments at the provincial, municipal, and autono-
mous region levels have authority to establish site use fees according to the purpose of
use, environmental conditions, expenses for requisition, and other requirements regard-
ing the infrastructure needs of the proposed venture. Id.
75. Land Use Fees Arranged On Sliding Scale, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Daily Report: China, Aug. 19, 1986, at K7; China Adopts Measures, supra
note 9, at 5, col. 1. In 1986, the annual fee for unfurnished office space in Beijing was
$360 per square meter; in Guangzhou, $360 to $480 per square meter;, and in Tianjin,
$600 per square meter. Id.; cf. id. (stating that office space in Hong Kong rents for
$431 per square meter annually, office space in Singapore rents for $237 annually, and
in Sydney office space rents for $338 annually). Id.
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of local officials .7  The absence of precise guidelines for determining
land value also permitted Chinese investors to inflate artificially the
value of the land they contributed to ventures."
In comparison to the exorbitant fees charged under the old system,
the new site use fee range will substantially reduce land rents for quali-
fying enterprises. The new precise standards will also prevent Chinese
partners from inflating the value of their land contributions. Enter-
prises that are not categorized as export or technologically advanced
enterprises, 78 however, will continue to face higher rents because local
officials retain discretionary authority. 9
C. REDUCED LABOR COSTS
In addition to reducing land rents, the new Provisions reduce labor
costs. Article 3 of the Provisions exempts export and technologically
advanced enterprises from having to pay many staff and worker subsi-
dies.80 Joint ventures, however, must continue to pay for labor insur-
ance, welfare costs, and housing subsidies.8
Although China claims to offer low labor costs, 82 foreign investors
often discover that inefficient workers and high labor costs make the
production of certain products in China more expensive than in the
76, See Provisional Regulations Concerning the Use of Land for Construction by
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, art. 2, issued by the State
Council on July 26, 1980, reprinted in 1 Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet
3, at 143 [hereinafter 1980 Site Use Fee Regulations] (listing the site use fee range
from RMB 5 to RMB 300 per annum). This was equivalent to between $10 and $600.
Id. These provisions were originally internal rules known as neibu. See infra note 218
(explaining the Chinese use of neibu). Article 2 further stipulates that fees in districts
located on the outskirts of large and medium sized cities are set at a minimum of RMB
10. 1980 Site Use Fee Regulations, supra, art. 2. The lack of standards defining
"large" and "medium" sized cities presents obvious problems. Although fees are paid
annually, the total fees for the first calendar year are reduced. Id. art. 52.
Prior to the enactment of these Provisions, some provincial and municipal govern-
ments issued new laws with lower price ranges. Land Use Fees Arranged On Sliding
Scale, supra note 75, at K7. The new fee standards account for a renter's intended use
of the land. Id.
77. Moser, supra note 28, at 121-22. Chinese participants already possessing a site
use right may contribute this right to the venture. JVL, supra note 29, art. 48.
78. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the qualifications of
technologically advanced and export enterprises).
79. See JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 49 (noting that officials in provincial,
municipal, and regional levels may establish site use fees).
80. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 3; see also Salem, supra note 7, at 170 (discussing
the exemption from staff subsidies other than labor and welfare outlays).
81. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 3.




United States.83 As a result of the subsidization requirements, employ-
ees of joint ventures receive wages two to three times the amount paid
to employees of state-owned enterprises.' These high labor costs have
prompted many investors to turn to neighboring Asian economies
where labor costs are lower.8 5
The reduced labor costs offered in the Provisions are significant bene-
fits.88 Investors cited high labor costs as primary factors in investor dis-
satisfaction. 7 The savings resulting from lower labor costs, therefore,
will positively affect foreign perceptions of the investment environment
in China.88 The reductions in labor cost provided under article 3, how-
ever, apply only to export and technologically advanced enterprises."9
Ventures that do not qualify will continue to retain artificially high la-
bor costs.90
D. LOAN PRIORITY
The new Provisions grant export and technologically advanced enter-
prises priority in obtaining short-term loans for production, distribu-
tion, and other credit needs.9' Under the Joint Venture Loan Regula-
tions (JV Loan Regulations), ventures have permission to borrow both
foreign and renminbi funds to finance operations in China. 2 The Bank
83. See Sterba, supra note 2, at 3 (reporting that Roger Sullivan, President of the
National Council for U.S.-China Trade, stated that because Chinese labor is neither
cheap nor productive, it costs Nike more to produce shoes in China than in Maine);
Burns, supra note 4, at F7, col. 1 (stating that dismal productivity rates make it
cheaper to produce some products in Western Europe and the United States than in
China).
84. Moser, supra note 28, at 127.
85. See China Adopts Measures, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that investors looking
for cheap production costs are studying conditions in neighboring countries); see also
Sterba, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that Chinese wages are higher than those in most
Asian economies).
86. Zhang, supra note 43 (noting that exemptions from labor subsides will reduce
costs and help make Chinese products more competitive on the international market).
87. See Cheng, supra note 1, at 88 (stating that high labor costs are a primary
concern of foreign investors).
88. See China Adopts Measures, supra note 9, at 5 (explaining that the decline in
investment was partly due to rising dissatisfaction with artificially high labor costs).
89. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 3.
90. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the qualifications of
two new investment enterprises in the Provisions).
91. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 6; see also China Adopts Measures, supra note 9,
at 5 (stating that foreigners will have priority in receiving bank loans under the new
Provisions); Peking Announces Regulations, supra note 7, at 17, col. 5 (stating that the
new regulations grant enterprises priority access in obtaining loans).
92. Provisional Measures for Providing Loans to Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment by the Bank of China, art. 78, approved by the State Council on
March 13, 1981, promulgated by the Bank of China on March 13, 1981, reprinted in 1
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of China 93 provides three types of business loans: self-liquidating loans
for production and marketing costs, loans to cover accounts receivable
prior to the time the accounts are collected, and loans for long-term
investments in fixed assets or advanced technology.94 Despite the JV
Loan Regulations, obtaining loans for operating expenses has become a
major problem for many projects. 5 Tight credit controls in 1986 re-
stricted Chinese partners participating in proposed ventures from ob-
taining funds."8 In addition, cash starved enterprises have found them-
selves unable to secure long-term financing from foreign banks because
China does not have national mortgage and bankruptcy laws.9 In light
of these recent problems, the new banking provisions are significant
changes. Priority access to short-term loans will help export and tech-
nologically advanced enterprises that previously were unable to obtain
sufficient funds for their business activities.98 Priority access to these
funds, however, is again limited to export and technologically advanced
enterprises."
E. TAX INCENTIVES
The new Provisions offer tax incentives to export and technologically
Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 3, at 137 [hereinafter JV Loan Regula-
tions]. Ventures require the approval of MOFERT or the local government to become
eligible for loan applications. Id.
93. See Chu, Banking and Finance in China Trade, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVEST-
MENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 1, at 232 (ex-
plaining that the Bank of China is the most important Chinese entity involved in inter-
national banking and finance). It is the state-owned foreign exchange bank of China.
Id. The People's Bank of China is the central bank of China and supervises the admin-
istration of the Bank of China. Id. at 230-32.
94. JV Loan Regulations, supra note 92, art. 3; see also Lussenburg, supra note
26, at 571-72 (describing three types of loans envisaged under the JV Loan
Regulations).
95. China Adopts Measures, supra note 9, at 5.
96. Cheng, supra note 1, at 88. Foreign currency controls also contributed to the
problems plaguing foreign investors. China Adopts Measures, supra note 9, at 5.
97. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 12. On December 2, 1986, the National
People's Congress Standing Committee issued, for trial implementation, The Law of
the People's Republic of China Governing Enterprise Bankruptcy. The Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China Governing Enterprise Bankruptcy (for trial implementation),
adopted by the 6th National People's Congress on Dec. 2, 1986. See generally Peng
Xiaohua, Characteristics of China's First Bankruptcy Law, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373
(1987) (explaining that the new bankruptcy law is an effort to make state-owned enter-
prises more autonomous and more responsible for their economic performance).
98. See China Adopts Measures, supra note 9, at 5 (stating that obtaining loans
for operating expenses had become a major problem for some investors).
99. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 6. But see Eliasoph, supra note 51, at 16 (report-
ing that Shanghai plans to adopt a liberal definition of what constitutes an export or
technologically advanced enterprise).
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advanced enterprises. 100 For example, income taxes for export enter-
prises with exports equalling seventy percent of their total sales for a
year, are cut in half after their standard tax holidays expire.1a0 Simi-
larly, following the expiration of the standard tax holidays, 0 2 techno-
logically advanced enterprises may enjoy a fifty percent reduction in
income taxes for an additional three years.10 3 Article 7 of the new Pro-
visions also exempts export and technologically advanced enterprises
from the ten percent tax on profits remitted abroad.'"
Under the Joint Venture Income Tax Law,105 the basic income tax
rate is thirty percent.106 This tax is coupled with a surtax of ten percent
of the base income tax paid, 0 7 for a total tax of thirty-three percent. 03
100. Provisions, supra note 8, arts. 8, 9, & 10.
101. Id. art. 8. Export firms in the Special Economic Zones that pay taxes at a rate
of 15% will pay 10% under the new provisions. Id.; see also Foreign Investment Regu-
lations, supra note 68, at 3 (reporting 50% reductions for export enterprises selling at
least 70% of their production abroad). This reduction is available when the standard
exemption or reduction of income tax ends. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 8.
102. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Re-
garding the Amendment of "The Joint Venture Income Tax Law of the People's Re-
public of China Concerning Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment,"
passed by the Second Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National Peo-
ple's Congress on Sept. 2, 1983, reprinted in 1 Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8,
Booklet 5, at 33 [hereinafter Amendment]. The Amendment enables newly established
joint ventures to apply for a full tax exemption during their first two profit-making
years, and a 50% reduction for the next three years. Id. To qualify, investors must
schedule the ventures to operate for at least 10 years. Id.; Gelatt & Pomp, China's Tax
System: An Overview and Transnational Analysis, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVEsMIENT
AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note I, at 44.
Local officials determine who qualifies for specific tax reductions and exemptions.
The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, passed by the Third Session of the Fifth Na-
tional People's Congress on Sept. 10, 1980, art. 5, reprinted in I Com. Bus. & Trade
L., supra note 8, Booklet 5, at 15 [hereinafter JV Income Tax Law]. The JV Income
Tax Law defines "the first profit making year" as the first year the company begins to
make a profit after accounting for any loss carryovers. JV Income Tax Law, supra, art.
5; JV Income Tax Regulations, supra note 40, art. 5; Gelatt & Pomp, supra, at 44.
Certain types of ventures receive further tax reductions. For instance, joint ventures in
"low profit" operations such as farming or forestry, or ventures located in remote, un-
developed areas may apply for a 15 to 30% reduction in income tax over a 10 year
period. JV Income Tax Law, supra, art. 5.
103. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 9; see also Foreign Investment Regulations,
supra note 68, at 3 (reporting a 50% reduction and exemption for three years granted
to technologically advanced enterprises). This reduction is available only at the end of
the enterprise's initial tax holidays. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 9.
104. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 7; Salem, supra note 10, at 170.
105. JV Income Tax Law, supra note 102, art. 3; JV Income Tax Regulations,
supra note 40, art. 3; Gelatt & Pomp, supra note 102, at 44.
106. JV Income Tax Law, supra note 102, art. 3; JV Income Tax Regulations,
supra note 40, art. 3.
107. JV Income Tax Law, supra note 102, art. 3; JV Income Tax Regulations,
supra note 40, art. 3; Gelatt & Pomp, supra note 102, at 44.
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An amendment to the Joint Venture Income Tax Law provides a full
tax exemption to newly established firms for their first two profit-mak-
ing years, and a fifty percent reduction for the following three years.1"'
To qualify, investors must schedule their enterprises to operate for ten
years. 110 In addition, a prior law imposed a ten percent tax on venture
participants that remit profits abroad."1 '
It is unlikely that the new tax incentives will have a major impact on
investor perceptions of the business climate in China because prior tax
rates and holidays were not a source of foreign investor complaints."'
In general, tax breaks in China are of limited value because few firms
make enough money to generate significant tax bills."" The extension
of the fifty percent tax reduction for export enterprises, however, could
make a difference over time because this reduction apparently contin-
ues indefinitely. Profitable technologically advanced enterprises may
also benefit from an additional three years of a fifty percent reduction
in their tax rate. The exemption from the remitted profits tax is a sig-
nificant improvement over the earlier ten percent tax." 4
F. SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS GRANTING SPECIAL BENEFITS TO
EXPORT AND TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED ENTERPRISES
Overall, the benefits provided for export and technologically ad-
vanced enterprises under the new Provisions should improve the foreign
investment climate in China. With the caveats about the power
shortage in China and the less developed communications network, pri-
ority in communications, transportation, and utility services will pro-
vide predictability for ventures operating on tight production schedules.
108. JV Income Tax Law, supra note 102, art. 3; JV Income Tax Regulations,
supra note 40, art. 3; Gelatt & Pomp, supra note 102, at 44.
109. Amendment, supra note 102, art. 1; see also Gelatt & Pomp, supra note 102,
at 104 (stating that a subsequent law extended the exemptions for two, and then three
years after the first profit-making year).
110. JV Income Tax Law, supra note 102, art. 5; see also Gelatt & Pomp, supra
note 102, at 44 (stating that investors must schedule their enterprises to operate for at
least 10 years to qualify for the tax exemptions).
11. JV Income Tax Law, supra note 102, art. 4; JV Income Tax Regulations,
supra note 40, art. 4.
112. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing investor complaints that did
not include discontent with the tax system in China).
113. Salem, supra note 7, at 170 (reporting that lack of profits has made taxation a
moot point); see also infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (stating that ventures
have had trouble generating sufficient foreign exchange in China).
114. Zheng & Kwan, Foreign Investment Provisions Lay Groundwork for Im-
proved Chinese Investment Climate, EAST ASIAN REP., Dec. 1986, at 9 (stating that
the tax holidays in the Provisions are significant); see also supra note 104 and accom-
panying text (explaining a 10% tax on profits remitted abroad).
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The measures will reduce, and possibly eliminate, increases in produc-
tion costs due to delays in these basic services. Similarly, the reduced
land rents and labor costs will reduce production costs in China. The
tax measures do not resolve any existing investor complaints, but they
do offer benefits investors are unlikely to reject. Although close scrutiny
of each of the articles reveals some inherent flaws, these Provisions
should significantly improve the investment environment in China.
III. PROVISIONS CONFERRING BENEFITS ON ALL
FOREIGN ENTERPRISES
A. MANAGEMENT AUTONOMY GRANTED
Article 15 of the Provisions guarantees all foreign investment enter-
prises management autonomy and the right to use "advanced scientific
methods. 11 5 The grant of management autonomy provided under the
Provisions affords investors the right to make policy and economic
plans without state interference. " 6 These are sensitive issues for foreign
joint venture partners.
Under the JVL Regulations, local planning and administrative de-
partments could not issue directives on production and operating plans
to joint ventures." 7 Despite this proviso, before the Provisions were en-
acted, local officials often interfered in the policy making and economic
planning of joint ventures, treating them as if they were state-owned
enterprises." 8 Despite this history, investor skepticism about local and
provincial compliance should decrease because the Leading Group"'
now monitors the implementation of the Provisions. 20
115. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 15; see also Foreign Investment Regulations,
supra note 68, at 3 (stating that the Provisions allow export and technologically ad-
vanced enterprises management in "accordance with international advanced scientific
methods").
116. See JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 33 (stating that the board of direc-
tors is the highest decision-making authority in a venture).
117. Id. art. 56.
118. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 13; see also Pattison, supra note 72, at 116
(stating that given the nature of the Chinese economic and political systems, the super-
visory industrial departments and local party committees exerting control over collec-
tives and state-run factories, will involve themselves in ventures' policy making and
economic planning). One of the most startling examples of local official interference
occurred in Hubei province, when a local administrator fired the manager and deputy
manager of a joint venture while on an "administrative check." Cohen & Chang, supra
note 5, at 13. The Provincial government subsequently reinstated the managers and
castigated the local department for its interference. Id.
119. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of the
Leading Group on foreign investment).
120. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing past experiences
with local officials who ignore national directives on foreign investors' rights, and the
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Governmental interference, however, is not the only constraint placed
on foreign managers. Chinese adherence to the principle of "equality
and mutual benefit" '121 also inhibits foreign participants from effec-
tively using their management and technical expertise in management
and broad decision-making. 22 This principle underlies the requirement
that foreign managers reach an agreement with their Chinese deputies
on every management decision and greatly limits foreign managers'
ability to make independent decisions. 23 This principle also is the rea-
son why Chinese partners insist that half the board of directors be com-
posed of foreigners and half be composed of Chinese. 12 4 This voting
structure results in frequent deadlock votes, with the Chinese members
voting one way and the foreigners voting the other way.125 These con-
straints on decision making are a source of great frustration for foreign
investors.1 26
Despite the new grant of management autonomy, it is unlikely that
the Provisions will temper the Chinese commitment to the principle of
resulting skepticism of investors about prospects for local compliance with the new
Provisions).
121. See JVL, supra note 29, art. 6 (stating that the principle of "equality and
mutual benefit" will govern important board decisions). Rong Yiren, from the China
International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) explained the principle of
"equality and mutual benefit" as applied to joint venture governance as follows:
In an enterprise no matter whether the amount of the capital is big or small,
matters can be decided only by unanimous consultation of both parties. Conse-
quently, we provided in our joint venture law that decisions will be made by the
Board of Directors through the method of consultation, and not in proportion to
the stock or to the amount of the investment.
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE, SELLING TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA 269
(N. Ludlow ed. 1979), cited in Pattison, supra note 72, at 114 n.136; see also Lus-
senburg, supra note 26, at 554 (stating that the principle of "equality and mutual
benefit" reflects the Chinese historical distrust of the West, and a general skepticism of
the capacity and willingness of the West to deal fairly with China).
122. See Moser, supra note 28, at 125 (discussing board and daily management
decision-making problems associated with board membership and consultation
requirements).
123. Id.
124. Pattison, supra note 72, at 114 (reporting that the principle of "equality and
mutual benefit" is the spirit behind the Chinese insistence that board membership not
correlate with equity ownership); see also Moser, supra note 28, at 125 (indicating that
Chinese negotiators insist on an equal number of seats on the board of the venture).
125. Moser, supra note 28, at 125.
126. See Pattison, supra note 72, at 115 (stating that questions of control and man-
agement continue to concern investors); Sterba, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that for-
eigners are frustrated in their attempts to implement new management techniques); see
also Department of Commerce Telegram from the American Consulate in Shanghai to
Washington (Jan. 24, 1984) (available at the National Council for U.S.-China Trade,
Washington, D.C.) (stating that the Chinese accept new management techniques in
principle, but have difficulty instituting these new ideas). Cultural traits such as "sav-
ing face" impede the efficient identification and solution of problems. Id.
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"equality and mutual benefit."127 Adherence to this principle requires
the consultative decision-making style that now inhibits foreign board
members and managers from making efficient and independent man-
agement decisions within their individual ventures.128 Autonomous de-
cision making inside ventures, therefore, may still elude foreign
participants.
B. STEPS TOWARD RESOLVING PERSONNEL AND PRODUCTIVITY
PROBLEMS
The Provisions also provide foreign managers increased control over
the selection and dismissal of Chinese workers. For example, all enter-
prises have the right to recruit and employ local personnel and to dis-
miss workers, by filing a report with the local labor and personnel de-
partment. 1 2  In addition, article 15 provides enterprises with the
authority to determine wages and to institute incentive systems.130
Prior to the new Provisions, trade unions and local government labor
departments played major roles in labor management. The JVL Regu-
lations required both the venture and the trade union, 131 if one was
formed, to sign employment contracts.3 2 The old law required the local
labor department to approve every signed labor contract.1 33 Joint ven-
tures may now hire workers that the local labor department recom-
mends, or workers that the venture recruits itself, with the consent of
the local labor department. 34 All individuals hired must pass a qualify-
127. See supra note 121 (discussing the principle of "equality and mutual bene-
fit"). Leaders in China firmly believe that the principle will protect their sovereignty
and prevent foreign dominance. See Note, China, Modernization, and Sino-United
States Trade: Will China Submit to Arbitration?, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53, 57-59
(1980) (describing the Chinese commitment to self-reliance as a product of foreign
oppression experienced during the Opium Wars from 1830 to 1842).
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing how the "principle of
equality and mutual benefit" results in deadlocked voting structures and requires con-
sultative decision- making).
129. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 15; Peking Announces Regulations, supra note
7, at 17, col. 5.
130. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 15.
131. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, arts. 95-97. To protect their democratic
rights and material interests, staff and workers in a joint venture have the right to set
up a trade union, with the assistance of the venture. Id.
132. JV Labor Management Regulations, supra note 40, art. 2. The regulations
provide an exception for small businesses, allowing them to sign labor contracts with
individuals instead of a union. Id.
133. Id.; see also Moser, supra note 28, at 126 (stating that the labor management
department of local governments must approve contracts); Lussenburg, supra note 26,
at 563 (stating that the labor management department must approve signed labor
contracts).
134. JV Labor Management Regulations, supra note 40, art. 3; see also Moser,
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ing examination.135 The regulations also allow foreign investors to dis-
miss unnecessary or incompetent workers. a38
Despite prior laws and regulations permitting foreigners to select and
recruit employees, 3 7 in practice the Chinese participants and the For-
eign Enterprise Service Corporation (FESCO) 13 8 usually provide the
staff for the venture. 139 Chinese partners frequently induced foreign
partners to accept personnel that Chinese officials recommended and
usually did not actively select workers on their own. 40 The workers
ventures employ often prove unsatisfactory to foreign participants.'4
Foreign managers rarely exercise their right to fire unsatisfactory
workers due to procedural barriers in the JV Labor Management Reg-
ulations." Before a venture can dismiss a worker, the local labor de-
partment must approve the dismissal and the trade union must have
the opportunity to proffer an objection to the venture's board of direc-
tors.'43 If this does not resolve the issue, the aggrieved party may then
seek conciliation144 or arbitration in a Chinese arbitral body.'4 5 In prac-
supra note 28, at 126 (stating that joint ventures can employ workers the local labor
department recommends, or recruit workers on their own with consent); Lussenburg,
supra note 26, at 563 (stating that either local authorities or the joint venture will
recruit workers).
135. JV Labor Management Regulations, supra note 40, art. 3.
136. Id. art. 4; see also JVL Rk'gulations, supra note 35, art. 39 (stating that the
general manager, usually a foreigner, has the power to appoint and dismiss subordi-
nates). Dismissal must follow the guidelines stated in the labor contract, and the em-
ployee must receive compensation. JV Labor Management Regulations, supra note 40,
art. 4; see also Moser, supra note 28, at 127 (stating that the local labor department
arranges alternative employment for the dismissed worker); Pattison, supra note 72, at
132 (asserting that dismissed workers are entitled to unspecified compensation from the
venture and will receive new work assignments from the local authorities).
137. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing the law governing
ventures and the local labor department's recruitment of workers).
138. Horsley, Business Regulation in China, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at
24, 30. The FESCO is the organization in Beijing authorized to provide personnel for
Sino-foreign enterprises. Id.
139. Moser, supra note 28, at 126.
140. Id.
141. See Pattison, supra note 72, at 131 n.226 (stating that because workers know
that contract dismissal provisions are meaningless, they work at low levels of effi-
ciency); Burns, supra note 4, at F7, col. 1 (highlighting the concern about dismal pro-
ductivity rates); Sterba, supra note 2, at 1 (stressing investors' dissatisfaction with un-
qualified local personnel).
142. See JV Labor Management Regulations, supra note 40, arts. 5-6 (detailing
procedures for dismissal and discipline of workers). Poorly negotiated contract provi-
sions covering the hiring and firing of employees can also cause problems with subse-
quent dismissals. See Pattison, supra note 72, at 131 (stating the importance of fastidi-
ous attention to selection and labor provisions in contracts).
143. JV Labor Management Regulations, supra note 40, arts. 5-6.
144. Id. art. 14; JVL supra note 29, art. 14.
145. JV Labor Management Regulations, supra note 29, art. 14. The parties can
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tice, these procedural requirements make it very difficult to fire a
worker.1
46
The JV Labor Management Regulations also grant limited discretion
to the board of directors to establish wage standards and bonus sys-
tems.147 The regulations require ventures to pay workers 120 to 150
percent of the real wages that state-owned enterprises in the same in-
dustry and locality pay their workers.' 48 Because FESCO sets wages in
foreign ventures without regard to individual productivity, workers
have no economic incentive to work efficiently. 49
The new grant of power to hire and fire workers strips away the pro-
cedural and practical barriers that existed under prior law.' 00 Investors
previously dissatisfied with workers that local labor departments and
FESCO' 5' assigned to them, or those that their Chinese partners se-
lected, will welcome the opportunity to select their own workers. For-
eign partners formerly blocked from dismissing undesirable workers
will also applaud the freedom to fire unsatisfactory workers. The possi-
bility of implementing capitalist wage incentives is another major im-
provement to the Chinese investment environment.
agree to use another arbitral body. Id. It is up to the parties to decide whether to seek
conciliation prior to arbitration. When parties agree to arbitrate, they must decide
whether to arbitrate in China or abroad. Cohen, supra note 19, at 300; see Yeow Ming
Choo, supra note 19, at 48-49 (discussing the pitfalls of arbitration in a Chinese arbi-
tral body).
146. Moser, supra note 28, at 127.
147. JV Labor Management Regulations, supra note 40, art. 9.
148. Id. art. 8; Moser, supra note 28, at 127; Lussenburg, supra note 26, at 564.
149. See Horsley, Chinese Labor, supra note 82, at 27 (stating that because work-
ers are paid indirectly through the Foreign Enterprise Service Corporation, FESCO,
which siphons off a portion of the wages, incentives are undermined); Pattison, supra
note 72, at 130 (reporting that ventures are unsure that they can derive incentives from
paying higher wages than state-owned enterprises because ventures are unable to verify
how much is ultimately paid to the worker). The introduction of labor contracts in
state-owned enterprises signals an acknowledgement of Chinese worker productivity
problems. Id.; see Salem, Reforms Urgently Needed to Avert Decline, FAR E. EcoN.
Rav., Mar. 19, 1987, at 76 (reporting that the labor-contract system addresses the
roots of productivity problems in China). Among the leading problems is the "iron rice
bowl mentality;" an individual's belief that because everyone cats from the same giant
rice bowl, he or she can be less efficient at work without affecting the amount of rice he
or she receives from the giant bowl. Id.
150. See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text (discussing the practical reali-
ties of hiring and firing workers).
151. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text (discussing the role of labor
departments and the FESCO in the selection of workers). FESCO's practice of screen-
ing applicants for their political suitability exacerbates the investor's labor problems.
Horsley, supra note 82, at 27.
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C. MEASURES ERODING BUT NOT ELIMINATING THE FOREIGN
EXCHANGE QUANDARY
Article 14 of the new Provisions permits all enterprises to mutually
adjust their foreign exchange imbalances . 52 Local foreign exchange
control departments must supervise these transactions.'0 3 Article 14
also proposes a cash security service that will permit ventures with a
foreign exchange surplus to use foreign exchange as collateral for
renminbi loans, and then to reclaim the foreign currency upon repay-
ment in renminbi. T5 In addition, article 14 authorizes foreign enter-
prises to borrow renminbi.' 55
The heart of the foreign exchange problem in China is the noncon-
vertibility of Chinese currency.1 6 To prevent ventures from taking
scarce foreign exchange out of China, the 1979 JVL "encouraged" ven-
tures to export their products to generate the foreign currency needed
to repatriate profits and make purchases abroad.57 The burden of gen-
152. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 14. Adjustments are made under the supervision
of the foreign exchange control departments. Id.; see also Cheng, supra note 1, at I
(citing the new provision that allows joint ventures to adjust foreign exchange imbal-
ances among themselves).
Chen Shunhen, a member of the Leading Group, announced that one set of regula-
tions will allow joint ventures to earn foreign exchange by selling products in the do-
mestic market that replace imports. Becker, China Plans Provisions for Import Substi-
tution, J. Com., Nov. 24, 1986, at 4a, col. 1; see also Schiffman, Chinese Regulations
Seek to Mollify Foreign Investors, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1986, at 12, col. I (describing
the import substitution provision). The State Planning Commission issued the antici-
pated Import Substitution Regulations on Nov. 23, 1987. Supra note 42.
153. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 14.
154. Id.; see also Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 13 (explaining the cash secur-
ity system created pursuant to article 14).
155. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 14.
156. Gelatt, supra note 17, at 28.
157. JVL, supra note 29, art. 9; see also Moser, supra note 28, at 131 (stating that
the effect of the regulations on foreign exchange is to require joint ventures to generate
all foreign currency necessary for purchasing and distributions). Foreign purchases in-
clude purchases of equipment and raw materials required for operation. JVL, supra
note 29, art. 9.
Article 75 of the JVL Regulations specifically requires joint ventures to balance their
foreign exchange expenses and income. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 75. The
JVL Regulations allow joint ventures producing import substitutes or products China
urgently needs, to sell primarily on the domestic market. Id. art. 61. Article 75 further
provides that the foreign exchange imbalances of joint ventures will be corrected
through the use of foreign exchange surpluses of the local government, or, if local gov-
ernments are unable to correct the deficiency, the problem will be corrected through
the use of national government reserves. Id. To qualify for government assistance in
correcting foreign exchange imbalances, the investor must anticipate the imbalance and
include it in his or her feasibility study and contract. Lecture by Qi Ruijing, Section
Chief, Treaties and Law Department, MOFERT, Fourth U.S.-China Joint Legal Sem-
inar, at United States Department of Commerce in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 12-13,
1986) [hereinafter Lecture by Qi]. A few investors were able to obtain clauses for
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erating all necessary foreign currency forces most investors to export
all but a small portion of their products.158 The initial dreams of access
to the huge domestic market therefore remain nothing more than
dreams.159 Joint ventures have not earned sufficient foreign currency to
enable them to sell extensively in China.1 60
In January 1986, the State Council issued foreign exchange mea-
sures designed to assist troubled joint ventures balance their foreign
exchange.16' The Provisions to Encourage Foreign Investment specifi-
cally alter article 9 of the Foreign Exchange Measures. Article 9 al-
lowed foreign investors who owned several ventures to adjust foreign
exchange imbalances among themselves.16 2 The local government for-
eign exchange departments approved and executed such transactions
government assistance in resolving imbalances in their feasibility studies and contracts
in 1984. Gelatt, supra note 17, at 28. Since then, however, these contract provisions
have been impossible to negotiate. Id. Therefore, the assistance offered in correcting
foreign exchange imbalances under the existing law has not alleviated the problems of
firms with foreign exchange deficiencies.Qi Ruijing also announced that the provision for resolving foreign exchange imbal-
ances covers only foreign investors from countries that have a bilateral investment
treaty with China. Lecture by Qi, supra. This new prerequisite is clearly aimed at
inducing the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the State Department
to concede on issues that have blocked the completion of a United States-China bilat-
eral investment treaty. See Frisbee, supra note 19, at 41 (outlining the four major
issues preventing completion of a United States-China bilateral investment treaty as of
1987).
158. Moser, supra note 28, at 131-32; see Gelatt, supra note 17, at 28 (stating that
foreign firms interested in penetrating the Chinese market have confronted repatriation
problems).
159. The Restricted Market, CHINA TRADE REP., Oct. 1986, at 5 (stating that
tariff and nontariff barriers and lack of market information on Chinese consumers re-
strict access to the domestic market).
160. See Burns, supra note 4, at Fl, col. 1 (reporting that foreign exchange defi-
ciencies plague all but a small number of projects, and that only the hotel projects
receiving foreign currency from tourists are free from this problem); see also Cheng,
supra note 1, at 88 (reporting that interruptions in the American Motors Corporation
Beijing Jeep venture's production due to insufficient foreign exchange to purchase
needed imports, has become a symbol of the foreign exchange quagmire in China).
161. Regulations of the State Council Concerning the Issue of Balancing Foreign
Exchange Receipts and Disbursements by Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment, promulgated by the State Council on Jan. 15, 1986, reprinted in 2 Com.
Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 7, at 99 [hereinafter 1986 FX Regulations].
162. Id. art. 9. Methods offered in the 1986 foreign exchange measures that the
Provisions do not affect include: (1) taking advantage of foreign investor's sales con-
tracts to export Chinese-made products, id. art. 6; (2) reinvesting in other Chinese
enterprises that generate additional foreign exchange, id. art. 10; (3) selling joint ven-
ture products in China for payment in foreign currency, id. art. 8; (4) having the de-
partment that approved the joint venture contract resolve the imbalance, id. art. 3; (5)
selling joint ventures' import substitutes to Chinese enterprises for payment in foreign
currency, id. art. 5; and (6) producing technologically advanced products that are of
superior quality and competitive on the international market, to gain special access to
the domestic market. Id. art. 4.
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and all parties including the Chinese partners had to concur.163 For
example, if a foreign investor was a partner in two ventures and one
venture had a foreign exchange deficit and the other had a surplus,
article 9 allowed the investor to adjust the foreign exchange balances of
the two ventures provided the Chinese partner agreed.164 Investors
therefore could trade renminbi from their foreign exchange poor ven-
ture for renminbi from their foreign exchange rich venture. 6 '
These Foreign Exchange Measures, however, have not had a signifi-
cant effect on the foreign exchange problem. 6 The omission of a fi-
nancial incentive in article 9 for Chinese partners to agree to the ad-
justment transaction thwarts the measure.8 7 A financial incentive was
necessary because under the Foreign Exchange Measures, only the for-
eign participant, who owns both ventures, benefits.1 68 The Chinese part-
ner in the exchange-rich venture does not benefit, and therefore does
not have an incentive to agree to the transaction because his or her
company does not receive a gain. The Chinese government could create
an incentive by establishing a higher exchange rate for transactions be-
tween ventures selling foreign currency to a co-owner's exchange-poor
ventures.'69 As of 1987, however, the government had not provided an
exchange rate incentive.
Since passage of article 14 of the new Provisions, however, reports
indicate that ventures may bargain to establish the exchange rate ap-
plicable to these transactions. 7 This bargaining element provides the
financial incentive for Chinese partners to agree to the adjustment
transaction absent in the Foreign Exchange Measures. The incentive
should result in more transactions that help ventures balance their for-
eign exchange accounts. Although it will have a positive effect on inves-
tors, it is unlikely that it will generate enough foreign currency to re-
solve completely the foreign exchange quagmire.17 '
Article 14 of the Provisions also permits foreign exchange trade be-
tween companies that different foreign partners own, thereby increas-
ing the number of foreign exchange rich ventures with which a foreign
163. Id. art. 9.
164. See id. (providing that an owner of two ventures may adjust foreign exchange
imbalances between two companies he or she owns).
165. Id.









exchange poor venture may trade foreign currency.172 In addition, the
exchange requires only the supervision of the foreign exchange depart-
ment,17 3 thereby eliminating the Foreign Exchange Measure stipulation
that the foreign exchange control departments approve and execute the
transactions. 7" Access to a larger number of trading partners enlarges
the pool of hard currency available, thereby creating more opportuni-
ties for ventures to balance their foreign exchange accounts.
The Provisions also offer a new scheme for using foreign exchange as
collateral on renminbi loans.17 Article 14 no longer requires foreign
investors to sell their foreign exchange to banks for renminbi loans.
Instead, foreign investors can use their foreign currency as collateral
for renminbi loans and retrieve it when they repay the loan.' Preserv-
ing the future use of this foreign exchange will eliminate one drain on
investors' reserves.
Although article 14 of the Provisions does not solve the huge foreign
exchange problems in China, it does offer creative approaches for in-
creasing the amount of foreign exchange available for joint ventures
doing business in China. The alteration to article 9 of the Foreign Ex-
change Measures enlarges the pool of foreign currency available to ven-
tures that require foreign exchange. The ability to preserve the future
use of foreign currency as collateral in loans also enlarges the pool of
foreign exchange available to Sino-foreign companies. The reduction of
the activities of the foreign exchange departments from approval and
execution of transactions to supervision eliminates other cumbersome
procedures. Overall, these changes are likely to erode the foreign ex-
change problem, but not end the foreign exchange quandary.177
D. MEASURES PROVIDING TAX BREAKS FOR ALL ENTERPRISES
Article 10 of the new Provisions provides a full tax rebate to all en-
terprises reinvesting profits to establish or expand export or technologi-
cally advanced enterprises.11 8 Article 11 of the Provisions exempts most
172. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (describing the new provision for
mutual adjustment).
173. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 14; Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 13.
174. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 14; Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 13; see
1986 FX Regulations, supra note 161, art. 9 (requiring the approval of the state de-
partment for foreign exchange control).
175. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the new loan collater-
alizing scheme).
176. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 14.
177. See Berthelsen, supra note 17, at 8, col. I (discussing the depleted foreign
exchange reserves in China).
178. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 10. The newly established export or technologi-
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export products 79 from the consolidated industrial and commercial tax
(CICTA). °80 Under prior law, foreign partners who reinvested their
share of profits for at least five consecutive years received forty percent
of the income tax paid on those funds as a rebate.' 8' The exemption
from the CICTA and, presumably from customs duties for export prod-
ucts are helpful, but not significant benefits.8 2 Although the full rebate
for reinvesting in export or technologically advanced enterprises pro-
vides some incentives for such investment, it will not substantially ame-
liorate the larger deficiencies associated with the business environment
in China.'83
Article 16 of the new Provisions mandates implementation of the
"Circular of the State Council Concerning Firmly Curbing the Indis-
criminate Levy of Charges on Enterprises,"' previously applicable
only to state-owned enterprises. 185 Article 16 also directs provincial
governments to formulate specific methods to supervise implementation
of these new guidelines. 86 Foreign investors may refuse to pay unrea-
sonable 87 charges and appeal such charges to local economic commit-
tees. ' If redress is not obtained at the local level, investors may then
cally advanced enterprises must operate for at least five years. Id. To qualify, ventures
must apply to, and obtain approval from, the tax authorities. Id. The tax authorities
take back the refunded income taxes if the investment is withdrawn before five years of
operation. Id; see also Foreign Investment Regulations, supra note 68, at 3 (describing
tax returns for reinvestment in export-oriented or high-tech enterprises lasting more
than five years).
179. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 11. Crude oil, finished oil, and other products
subject to special state provisions are not exempted. Id.
180. Id.; see also Foreign Investors' Fears, supra note 4, at 1, col. 4 (listing the
exemption from consolidated industrial and commercial tax).
The CICTA, a broad-based turnover tax, is applied at each stage of production when
taxable goods or services are transferred from entity to entity. Pomp, Gelatt & Surrey,
The Evolving Tax System of the People's Republic of China, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 11,
19 (1981); Gelatt & Pomp, supra note 102, at 41. The tax is also levied at the retail
level when the goods are sold to the ultimate user. Id.
181. JV Income Tax Law, supra note 102, art. 6; Lussenburg, supra note 26, at
581-82.
182. See Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 13 (stating that other export license
benefits are more significant).
183. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (asserting that taxation is a moot
point for ventures that have not yet earned a profit).
184. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 13-14 (explaining that the Circular, aimed
at ending indiscriminate taxation, previously applied only to state-owned enterprises).
185. Id. at 14.
186. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 16.
187. Id. Article 16 does not define "unreasonable." Id. The forthcoming imple-
menting regulations will address this question. Zhang, supra note 43.
188. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 16; see also China Adopts Measures, supra note
9, at 5, col. 1 (reporting on the instructions to curb indiscriminate charges, and the
granting of a right to refuse to pay and to appeal such charges).
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seek review first at the provincial level, and later at the national level
before the State Economic Commission. 189
Foreign investors complain that the prior law gave local officials un-
limited discretion to determine tax exemptions and to impose arbitrary
taxes.19° In an attempt to curb indiscriminate tax charges, article 16 of
the Provisions allows foreign investors to challenge the validity of taxes
levied against them through an appeal procedure. 91 The benefits of ar-
ticle 16 will become more apparent when the implementing regulations
detail the procedures involved in the appeal of tax charges. 92 Investors
should view the appeal process with cautious optimism because it could
easily become another bureaucratic conundrum."9 3
E. MEASURES To FACILITATE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
Under the new Provisions, materials and parts imported for use in
manufacturing goods for export are exempt from import licensing.'"
Article 12 of the Provisions states that export licenses expire after six
months and that ventures do not have to export exclusively through
government trade corporations. 9 5 Under prior law, export licenses ex-
pired after six months, 196 while import licenses remained in effect for
one year.19 7 Before the new Provisions, ventures could export products
189. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 16.
190. Sterba, supra note 2, at 3, col. 4; see supra note 113 (stating that local offi-
cials have discretionary power to determine tax exemptions and reductions under JV
Income Tax Regulation article 4).
191. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 16.
192. See Zhang, supra note 43 (stating that the forthcoming implementing regula-
tions will detail the appeal procedures).
193. See infra notes 207-17 and accompanying text (describing commonplace
problems with bureaucratic inefficiency).
194. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 13. If the imported materials are used for prod-
ucts sold domestically, the exemption does not apply. Id.
195. Id. art. 12.
196. Provisional Measures Concerning the Export License System of the Import-
Export Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, art. 9, issued June 3, 1980,
reprinted in 2 Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 12, at 11.
The implementing rules list 212 commodities requiring an export license. A list of
212 Commodities under the Export License System, issued Jan. 1, 1987, reprinted in 2
Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra note 8, Booklet 12, at 19. The rules break items into
three categories: (1) those for which MOFERT must issue licenses, id. Booklet 12, at
19; (2) those for which MOFERT's special representatives located at various ports
must issue licenses, id. Booklet 12, at 24; and (3) those for which provincial, municipal,
or autonomous region MOFERT branches must issue licenses. Id. Booklet 12, at 29.
197. Provisional Regulations on the Import License System, art. 12, promulgated
by the State Council on Jan. 10, 1984, reprinted in 2 Com. Bus. & Trade L., supra
note 8, Booklet 12, at 45 [hereinafter 1984 Import Licensing Requirements].
In general, China implements the following import guidelines: (1) China will not
import goods hazardous to individuals' health; (2) if domestic products do not satisfy
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on their own or through government trading corporations.'98 In addi-
tion, approved ventures were exempt from import licensing require-
ments for goods within the scope of their contract,""9 but still had to
obtain licenses for designated controlled and prohibited goods.2 00
The article 13 import license exemption for export products is a sig-
nificant benefit for investors. It is important because many of the raw
materials and much of the equipment that ventures must import for
production are controlled or restricted.2 0' Eliminating the import li-
cense requirement for these raw materials and equipment makes China
more attractive for export processing.202 The exemption also implicitly
exempts these particular products from custom duties and the
CICTA,20 ' thus reducing red tape inconveniences at the border.0
With regard to export licenses, article 12 confirms that they expire af-
ter six months 20 5 and that foreign investors have the right to export
without using expensive government trading corporations °.2 0 Article 12,
therefore, does not extend prior law.
F. EFFICIENT AND COORDINATED BUREAUCRACIES?
Article 17 of the Provisions calls for all levels of the government to
strengthen their coordination of work, to improve efficiency, and to ex-
amine and approve matters that foreign enterprises bring to their atten-
tion.20 7 Completion of the approval process for joint venture projects
demand, China may import a limited number of comparable goods; (3) imports of
important raw materials and semi-finished materials that China does not produce are
encouraged; (4) priority is given to the sophisticated technology and equipment that is
necessary for Chinese modernization; and (5) China will permit importation of materi-
als processed or assembled for export in China. Interview with Sun Chung, China Eco-
nomic News, Oct. 12, 1981, at 2, cited in Horsley, supra note 1, at 17 & n.50.
198. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 62.
199. Horsley, supra note 1, at 17.
200. See id. (stating that authorized import corporations have a general license to
import commodities they are authorized to handle). Specially designated controlled and
prohibited goods are not within the scope of these general licenses. Id.
201. See Bangsberg, China Eases Foreign Firm's Import Laws, J. CoM., Dec. 1,
1986, at 1, col. 1 (reporting that general machinery, vehicles used in production, and
raw materials that ventures previously were required to obtain licenses for, are now
exempt under the new Provisions).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Cheng, supra note 1, at 89.
205. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 62.
206. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 13.
207. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 17; see Provisions to Encourage, supra note 44,
at 153 (stating that the Provisions give investors a mallet with which to coax foot-
dragging bureaucrats); Salem, supra note 7, at 170 (stating that the regulations will
reduce bureaucratic inefficiency if implemented); Peking Announces Regulations,
supra note 4, at 9, col. 4 (stating that the Provisions promise reductions in bureaucratic
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must not take more than three months from the date of submission."0 8
These articles attempt to reduce the cumbersome approval process, as
well as to urge all levels of the government to be responsive to investor
concerns.
Prior to the Provisions, approval of equity joint ventures required the
submission of an application that included a feasibility study and a
contract 0 9 to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations20
(MOFERT) and its provincial, autonomous region or municipal
branches.211 In theory, the authorities were required to complete the
approval process within three months of submission.1 2
red tape).
208. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 17; Salem, supra note 7, at 170; see also Peking
Announces Regulations, supra note 4, at 9, col. 4 (reporting that the previously long
approval processing is now within a three month schedule).
209. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 9; see also Archer, The Role of Agencies
in Regulating Joint Ventures in China, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 195, 199-203 (1985)
(listing the documents that ventures submit and emphasizing the importance of devel-
oping a close working relationship with the local officials who give preliminary and final
approval). Although in many instances local officials have approval authority, the final
review powers and the issuance of a certificate rests with MOFERT. Moser, supra note
28, at 123.
A complete application includes a feasibility study; a joint venture agreement, con-
tract, and articles of association; a list of candidates for chairman, vice-chairman and
directors; and written opinions from the local authorities involved in the establishment
of the venture. Id. Moser comments that despite the apparent formality of the docu-
mentation requirements, the actual practice is much less formal, sometimes involving
merely the submission of informal notes from meetings. Id.
210. See supra note 43 (discussing the function of MOFERT).
211. Lussenburg, supra note 26, at 552 n.32 (explaining that as part of a decen-
tralization drive, MOFERT gave approval authority to the local levels of government
for certain investment projects). Local branches may approve joint venture projects
falling within set dollar limits, as well as those not in conflict with state raw material
allocation plans, national fuel and transportation plans, or foreign trade quotas. Id. at
552. Various dollar figures and conditions for determining local level approval author-
ity are listed in informal guidelines. Id. A 1984 study reported that the Shanghai and
Tianjin branches had authority to approve projects costing up to S30 million, while the
Dalian branch had a $10 million limit. Xingfen, The Coastal Cities Stride Ahead,
INTERTRADE, Aug. 1984, at 47-48, cited in Lussenburg, supra note 26, at 552 n.32.
The figures for 1987 indicate a $30 million approval limit for the Shanghai branch, a
$10 million limit for the Beijing, Dalian, and Guongzhou branches, and a $5 million
limit for most other provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. Zhang, supra
note 43. Most projects are now approved at the local level and MOFERT expects this
decentralization trend to continue. Id.
Despite overtures China has made to foreign capitalist investors, the Chinese leader-
ship remains firmly committed to a planned socialist economy. Moser, supra note 28, at
106. The approval process is designed to integrate acceptable investment projects into
the national economic plan. Id.
212. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 10. Within one month of a grant of
approval the joint venture must register with the local branch of the General Adminis-
tration for Industry and Commerce (GAIC), which has the authority to issue a busi-
ness license. Id. art. 11. Issuance of the license formally establishes the joint venture.
Id.
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The approval process, however, was extremely lengthy and unpre-
dictable.2 13 Procedures were burdened with delays,214 ambiguities, un-
expected special fees, and arbitrary decisions.210 In addition, decision-
making procedures were based on neibu, 16 internal rules unknown to
foreigners. Confusion also often arose over which government level had
approval authority.2"
The mandate in article 17 of the Provisions for improved bureau-
cratic coordination and efficiency in regard to foreign investor problems
is a welcome overture to investors frustrated by frequent bureaucratic
entanglements. Article 17 alone, however, will not bring about imple-
mentation.2 18 The three month approval deadline merely reiterates ex-
isting JVL article 3,219 and is intended to encourage local official com-
pliance with the earlier deadline.2
G. No RELIEF FOR RAW MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT PURCHASING
PROBLEMS
Article 15 of the new Provisions grants all foreign enterprises the
213. Lee & Ness, Investment Approval, CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1986, at 14(outlining the difficulties of dealing with the layers of bureaucracy involved in the ap-
proval and registration process in China).
214. See Peking Announces Regulations, supra note 4, at 9, col. 4 (stating that the
approval process can continue indefinitely); Sterba, supra note 2, at 1, col. 4 (citing
investor complaints about bureaucratic inefficiency). See generally Lee & Ness, supra
note 213, at 14-18 (detailing the approval and registration procedures and advising for
the study of the bureaucratic departments involved in the process).
215. See Sterba, supra note 2, at 1, col. 4 (describing bureaucratic inefficiency,
informal requirements of "gifts" and illicit commissions to coax delivery of contract
goods, and arbitrary declarations of "fair" taxes); Burns, supra note 4, at F7, col. 1(describing the Chinese attitude that foreigners have only the privileges that the Chi-
nese confer, and no rights in contract negotiations, and explaining the difficulties of
holding Chinese parties to the negotiated terms).
216. See Moser, Introduction, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Supra note 1, at 2-3 (explaining that published
rules form only part of the legal framework for business transactions in China). Chi-
nese administrators must follow a set of internal guidelines called neibu in interpreting
and implementing statutory law. Id. The content of neibu is generally not revealed to
foreigners, and therefore often complicates and obfuscates many business transactions
to the detriment of foreign participants. Id.
217. See Archer, supra note 209, at 200-01 (describing factors that affect local and
central approval authority).
218. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 13 (stating that exhortation of improved
efficiency and coordination is not convincing); see also supra notes 44-45 and accompa-
nying text (describing the history of local officials' noncompliance and opposition to
central government directives). But cf. Eliasoph, supra note 51, at 16 (reporting on the
recent issuance of investment-encouraging local measures and the establishment of ad-
ministrative organs designed to guide foreigners through bureaucratic mazes).
219. JVL, supra note 29, art. 3.
220. See Peking Announces Regulations, supra note 4, at 9, col. 4 (stating that the
process of obtaining approval can continue indefinitely).
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authority to purchase production materials within the scope of their
contracts22' and to determine operation and production plans." 2 Prior
to the new Provisions, ventures could purchase raw materials and
equipment needed for production abroad or in China, provided they
gave priority to purchasing within China when conditions were compa-
rable among suppliers.2 3 Prior law also permitted ventures to deter-
mine their operation and production plans. 2 4
Despite the authority to purchase materials under prior law, the sup-
ply of raw materials has become a serious problem for ventures in
China.225 Even when available, some materials are of such poor quality
that they are useless.228 Moreover, foreigners currently pay more for
supplies than Chinese state-owned enterprises.22 7 High prices and diffi-
culties in obtaining materials make the price of finished products less
221. Provisions, supra note 8, art. 15.
222. Id.
223. JVL, supra note 29, art. 9; JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 57; see also
Moser, supra note 28, at 129 (explaining that where conditions between foreign and
Chinese sources are equal, joint ventures are to give priority to Chinese supplies); Lus-
senburg, supra note 26, at 560 (stating that the JVL and the JVL Regulations provide
that, all other things being equal, joint ventures should give priority to Chinese
sources).
Purchasing procedures required of state-owned enterprises also govern joint ventures.
JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 58; Moser, supra note 28, at 129. Gold, silver,
platinum, petroleum, coal, and timber, the six raw materials used to manufacture ex-
port products, are priced according to international standards that the State Adminis-
tration of Foreign Exchange Control or foreign trade departments provide. JVL Regu-
lations, supra note 35, art. 65(1). Prices for coal and oil used to manufacture
domestically sold products, and for materials other than the six raw materials are the
same as those for state-owned enterprises. Id. at 65(3).
Foreign exchange shortages inhibit the joint venture manager's ability to purchase
materials abroad. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing the diffi-
culties attributable to insufficient foreign exchange including problems with foreign
purchases). The Foreign Economic Contract Law (FECL) in China went into effect on
July 1, 1985. Wei Jiaju, Law On Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interests, 3
CH NA L. REP. 166, 169 (1986). The FECL governs all contracts relating to trade,
investment, and commercial transactions. Id. at 166. Venture contracts to purchase
equipment and materials abroad are negotiated and executed according to the FECL.
Id. at 166-69.
224. JVL Regulations, supra note 35, art. 56. But cf. Pattison, supra note 72, at
116 (discussing local government interference in joint ventures' economic planning and
policy making).
225. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 12; see also China Adopts Measures, supra
note 9, at 1 (reporting that artificially high operating costs and an inability to obtain
needed parts and materials partially caused the 1986 investment decline).
226. See C. SCHLYTER & A. SEBELIUS, supra note 11, at 55 (describing Shanghai-
Squibb's receipt of glass bottles that could not withstand machine processing, even
though samples sent earlier survived the process).
227. Lussenburg, supra note 26, at 561; Peking Announces Regulations, supra
note 7, at 17, col. 5; cf. C. SCHLYTER & A. SEBEUUS, supra note 11, at 55 (stating
that prices of raw materials and intermediate products are three times higher in China
than the Chinese export prices for some products).
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competitive 228 and tarnish the investment image of China.22  The ab-
sence of a directive to charge joint ventures the same prices as state-
owned enterprises and the failure to grant them a priority for access to
raw materials are conspicuous shortcomings of the Provisions.280
H. SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS CONFERRING BENEFITS ON ALL
FOREIGN ENTERPRISES
The possibility of improving the productivity of Chinese workers with
wage incentives is an important breakthrough for foreign managers dis-
contented with the productivity of Chinese workers. In addition, the
grant of management autonomy appears to eliminate many of the limi-
tations of operating under the JVL and its regulations. The measures to
erode bureaucratic inefficiency will also help cure investor problems.
The lack of a grant of priority and price improvements for raw materi-
als and supplies, however, is significant deficiencies in the measures."'
Moreover, the Provisions will not resolve the foreign exchange quan-
dary. Although two of the new measures increase the pool of foreign
exchange available to joint ventures, they are unlikely to generate suffi-
cient foreign currency to solve the huge foreign exchange problem.2 3
The repatriation and foreign purchase problems arising from foreign
exchange deficiencies in China will therefore remain the primary im-
pediment to investor contentment.233
RECOMMENDATION
Because investors will not come to China if they cannot make money
228. See Lussenburg, supra note 26, at.560-61 (discussing the concern that higher
prices for materials ultimately harm the international competitiveness of many prod-
ucts); C. SCHLYTER & A. SEBELIUS, supra note 11, at 54-57 (explaining that prices of
materials and parts increase when foreigners press for quality improvement in the
available materials).
229. See China Adopts Measures, supra note 9, at 1 (describing high prices and
scarcity of raw materials as factors in the worsening investment climate in China).
230. See Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 12 (commenting that a guarantee of
priority in raw materials supply is a conspicuous omission in the Provisions). But cf.
Cheng, supra note 1, at 89 (reporting that although the Provisions do not guarantee
priority in access to raw material supplies, several cities including Beijing, Canton,
Tianjin, and Shanghai have established special companies to procure materials and
equipment for foreign investment enterprises).
231. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (citing increased costs and
harm to product price competitiveness resulting from supply access and pricing
problems).
232. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (analyzing the impact of the
new foreign exchange measures).
233. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text (explaining the constraints on
successful business operation that foreign currency restrictions impose).
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and send profits home, Chinese leaders must go beyond the foreign ex-
change measures contained in the Provisions and devise new solutions
to resolve this overarching investment problem. The Taiwan Statute for
Investment by Foreign Nationals23 provides a model that China should
consider as a possible solution. Under this approach, projects meeting
certain criteria qualify to convert local currency into foreign exchange
for repatriating profits and investing capital. 3 5 In addition, the 1987
Chinese Import Substitution Regulations 236 will provide another signifi-
cant source of foreign exchange for Sino-foreign ventures 237 by al-
lowing technologically advanced enterprises to sell products replacing
imports on the domestic market and receiving payment in foreign ex-
change.23 8 The leadership should consider extending this benefit to all
types of foreign enterprises in China.
Chinese policy makers might also set the renminbi exchange rate
closer to the market rate. The pool of available foreign exchange would
then increase as the price of American dollars is allowed to rise
freely. 239 Sino-foreign enterprises could then more easily convert their
renminbi earnings into foreign currency for repatriation and foreign
purchases. Until China takes these or similar measures, the Provisions
alone will not provide sufficient incentives for large inflows of foreign
investment.
CONCLUSION
From a broader perspective, the impact of the Provisions hinges on
the political and economic policies that the Chinese leadership chooses
to pursue, and on its attitude toward Western influences. Challenges to
the policy of opening to the West, such as the power struggle in early
234. Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, promulgated on July 14, 1954
(unpublished presentation available at Library of Congress, Far Eastern Law Division);
see also Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at I 1 (suggesting that the Taiwan Statute
provides a model for China to use).
235. See Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, supra note 234, arts 13, 14
& 17 (providing the procedures for investors to apply for exchange settlements against
the yearly income of net profit or interest accruing from their investment).
236. Import Substitution Measures, supra note 42, at 3, col. 1. China also issued
import substitution regulations for technologically advanced enterprises. Import Substi-
tution Regulations for Machinery and Electronics, supra note 42, at 3, col. I.
237. Cohen & Chang, supra note 5, at 14.
238. Import Substitution Regulations, supra note 42, art. 9 (stating that a joint
venture selling a product approved for import substitution may receive payment from a
domestic buyer in foreign exchange). The foreign exchange control authorities must
approve the transaction. Id.
239. See Chow, Development of a More Market-Oriented Economy in China, ScI-
ENCE Jan. 16, 1987, at 298 (stating that any exchange rate closer to the market rate
will lessen the need for strict control of foreign exchange).
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1987 that led to the ouster of then Secretary General Hu Yaobang,240
can have a chilling effect on foreign investment. Foreigners fear that
such political instability may affect the viability of their capitalist oper-
ations in China.2 1' Therefore, the impact of laws such as the Provisions
ultimately depends on the existence of political and economic policies
that inspire investor confidence in a stable investment environment in
China.
The results of the Thirteenth Communist Party Congress in Novem-
ber 1987 provide some certainty that investment conditions in China
will continue to improve. Newly appointed General Secretary of the
Communist Party Zhao Ziyang who, like his predecessor Deng Xiaop-
ing, recognizes the need in China for foreign technology, capital, and
know-how, announced plans to pursue market-oriented reforms.242 In-
vestors therefore can expect the new leadership to enforce the 1986
Provisions to Encourage Foreign Investment, and to guide the evolution
of Chinese investment laws toward more openness to the West.
240. See supra note 1 (discussing the open door policy and the efforts in China to
modernize through the introduction of foreign capital, technology, and know-how).
241. See Cheng, supra note 1, at 88 (stating that the foreign business community
has become cautious in the wake of the political turmoil of early 1987 and is hesitant
to invest further until implementation of the Provisions becomes apparent and political
stability returns); see also Southerland, supra note 1 (stating that foreigners were con-
cerned about the open door policy in China after the fall of Hu Yaobang).
242. See Gargan, More Change Due In China's Economy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26,
1987, at Al, col. 1 (reporting that Zhao Ziyang stated that China will accelerate the
introduction of Western capitalistic economic and financial methods into the Chinese
economy); see also Gargan, Chinese Premier Wins Appointment, supra note 1, at Al,
col. 4 (stating that the new Politburo is expected to pursue Deng Xioaping's program
aimed at freeing the Chinese economy from "the constraints of orthodox socialist plan-
ning"). Zhao reaffirmed the commitment to socialism, and indicated that China can
and will make use of expanded markets, technology, and the issuance of stocks and
bonds to develop its economy. Gargan, More Change Due in China's Economy, supra,
at Al, col. 1. China will also pursue a price reform program. Id.
At the Thirteenth Communist Party Congress Deng Xiaoping and numerous other
veterans of the Long March stepped down from the Central Committee and the
Politburo, the highest organs of the Communist Party. Id. The Congress elected Zhao
as the head of the Party, and elevated four additional newcomers to the five-member
Standing Committee. Id. They include Li Peng, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin. Id.
Hu is the only newcomer in the Standing Committee who consistently supported eco-
nomic change associated with Zhao. Id. Diplomats report that the other three support
the overall direction of Zhao's policies. Gargan, Chinese Premier Wins Appointment,
supra note I, at A8, col. 1. Deng's and Zhao's ability to persuade the conservative
elders to step down with Deng, after the turmoil surrounding the ouster of former
Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang in early 1987, indicates that the reformers
regained control in 1987. China's New Style, supra note 1, at Al, col. 2. Deng's retire-
ment also signals that he is confident that Zhao will lead the country further along in
the reforms that Deng started in 1978. Id.
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